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Abstract
Using the model of Rochet and Vives (2004), this note shows that a prudential reg-
ulator can in general not mitigate a bank’s failure risk solely by means of liquidity
requirements. However, their effectiveness can be restored if, in addition, minimum
capital requirements are met. This provides a rationale for capital requirements be-
yond the commonly envoked reasoning that they are to be used to control the riski-
ness of banks’ asset portfolios.
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1 Introduction
Can a prudential regulator reduce the risk of a bank failure ex ante by requiring the bank
to hold a larger liquidity buffer?
The answer to this question is not clear-cut. On the one hand, endowing banks with a
higher liquidity buffer enables them to withstand larger liquidity shocks without engaging
in loss-generating fire-sales and thus reduces the risk of illiquidity. As the overall proba-
bility of bank failure is a function of the probabilities of illiquidity and of insolvency, the
reduction in illiquidity risk also lowers the overall failure risk. Call this the liquidity effect.
On the other hand, the liquidity effect is accompanied by a second effect which increases
the probability of insolvency, thereby increasing the overall likelihood of failure. Call this
the solvency effect. It arises because liquid assets earn lower returns on average and thus
fail to generate the positive net returns which are needed to cover the bank’s liabilities.
In order to remain solvent, a larger liquidity buffer requires from the bank to achieve a
higher minimal return out of its risky, productive investments and therefore the bank’s in-
solvency risk rises with increases in liquidity holdings. Hence, there are two polar effects
at work and it is a priori not clear which of the two outweighs the other. This in turn en-
tails the danger that regulatory liquidity standards might actually raise, rather than lower,
the probability of a banking failure.
However, by applying the bank-run model of Rochet and Vives (2004), this note shows
that a prudential regulator can in fact reduce the bank’s overall failure risk by means of
liquidity requirements if and only if these are implemented in conjunction with minimum
capital requirements. This result provides a rationale for minimum capital standards be-
yond the commonly envoked reasoning that they are to be used to control the riskiness of
banks’ asset portfolios.
In their original analysis, Rochet and Vives (2004) only focus on the liquidity effect and
confirm that the liquidity effect has indeed a mitigating impact on the bank’s failure risk
if insolvency risk is not affected. But they neglect that, because of the different return
characteristics of liquid and illiquid assets, the bank’s insolvency risk is a function of its
balance sheet composition. As liquidity requirements have a direct impact on the balance
sheet composition, they directly affect the insolvency risk and put the solvency effect into
action. In what follows, I solve Rochet and Vives’s model by taking this dependency into
account. The solution then implies that to become effective, liquidity buffers need to be
backed by minimum capital requirements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a condensed de-
scription of Rochet and Vives’s model, which takes the dependency of insolvency on the
balance sheet into account.2 Section 3 contains the relevant comparative statics exercises.
Section 4 discusses the main policy implication and concludes.




Rochet and Vives (2004) study a bank that operates at three dates, indexed by τ ∈
{0, 1,2}. At τ= 0, the bank possesses equity of amount E0 and takes in wholesale deposits
D0 = 1. The deposit contract promises a repayment D > D0 independent of whether the
funds are withdrawn at τ= 1 or τ= 2.
Deposits are managed by fund managers who decide on behalf of the original investors
at τ = 1 about rolling over or withdrawing the funds. In case they suceed in obtaining
D, fund managers receive a fixed remuneration B. However, when they withdraw early
at τ = 1, they incur an additional cost of C . Limited liability implies that they receive a
payoff of zero in case the bank fails.3 Fund managers then adopt the following behavioral
rule: Withdraw at τ= 1 if and only if
(B− C)− (1− P)B > 0 ⇔ P > γ
where P is the probability that the bank fails and γ := C/B.
Of its funds, the bank invests amount I into a risky asset and keeps amount M in cash.
Hence, its initial balance sheet at τ= 0 reads
I +M = D0+ E0. (1)
The return on the risky asset is a normally distributed4 random variable R̃ with mean R̄
and precision (inverse variance) α. The risky asset is illiquid. It pays out the full return at
τ= 2, but can be sold at τ= 1 only against a fire-sale price R/(1+λ), where R is the re-
alization of the random return. Henceforth, λ is referred to as the fire-sale discount rate.
Of course, cash is highly liquid in the sense that it can be freely used to cover liabilities at
both τ= 1 or τ= 2.
2.2 Failure Conditions
Let x denote the proportion of deposits withdrawn early and let m := M/D denote the
liquidity ratio; the higher m is, the larger the interim deposit outflows can become which
the bank can meet without the need to fire-sell assets. Thus, as long as x < m, the bank
cannot come under liquidity stress at τ = 1 and thus can only fail due to insolvency at





3Rochet and Vives (2004, p.1121) provide further discussion about the assumption that fund managers
rather than depositors themselves manage the deposits.
4The assumption of normality is without loss of generality and is made for the purpose of obtaining
tractable analytical solutions.
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where Rs is called the solvency threshold. The initial balance sheet constraint (1) always






where e := D0+E0
D
. Whenever e ≥ 1, the bank would be able to repay its liabilities without
any risk. It is reasonable to assume e < 1, as Rochet and Vives implicitly do, which entails
necessity of investment and thus m< e.
Absent further interim sources of liquidity, the bank has to resort to the market whenever
x > m. In that case, it incurs liquidity costs per unit of the risky asset it liquidates.
Total liquidity costs rise with x and even when the bank is able to cover total interim
withdrawals x D, the associated liquidity costs can deplete its resources to such an extent
that it is unable to meet the remaining liabilities (1− x)D at τ = 2. Hence, the larger x
is, the larger interim liquidity costs are, and therefore the higher the critical return must
be above which the bank survives. The bank fails due to illiquidity at τ= 2 if5







RF(x , m) is (weakly) increasing in x . The operator {z}+ abbreviates max {0, z}.
Finally, the bank can already have failed at date 1 if liquidity pressure x D exceeded its
total available resources M + RI/(1 + λ). This entails early closure of the bank. The
respective condition for R is given by




Since early closure implies failure at date 2, REC(x , m)≤ RF(x , m).
The model described above is widely identical to Rochet and Vives’s (2004) original
model. The exception being that I have used the initial balance sheet constraint (1)
in order to eliminate I from equation (2), which results in the solvency threshold Rs being
a function of the liquidity ratio m, cf. equation (3). Rochet and Vives instead treat Rs as
independent from m in their comparative statics, which implies that they switch off what
I have called the solvency effect.6
2.3 Equilibrium
Observe that the bank always fails at τ= 2 for any R< Rs and it would always survive for
any R≥ (1+λ)Rs := limx→1 RF . Under common knowledge of R, the model would exhibit
5For the explicit derivation consult Rochet and Vives (2004, p. 1124).
6Rochet and Vives (2004, p. 1124) use the balance sheet constraint to eliminate M from Rs and express
Rs as a function of I . But then, on page 1125, they substitute out I by (D − M)/Rs in the conditions
for illiquidity failure while still maintaining that Rs is a function of I . Hence, their substitution entails a
circularity and they do not correct this circularity in the derivation of the comparative statics result in their
Proposition 3.
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multiple Nash equilibria for R ∈ [Rs, (1+ λ)Rs). Rochet and Vives therefore specify the
model as an incomplete information game by assuming that fund managers only observe
noisy signals about R. For a typical fund manager i,
s̃i = R+ εi,
where εi is normally distributed around 0 with precision β . A strategy for a typical fund
manager is then a mapping from the signal spaceR into the set of actions {withdraw, roll over}.
This structure permits the application of Global Game methods7 for the derivation of a
unique equilibrium. I only state Rochet and Vives’s result, for the proof, consult Rochet
and Vives (2004, p.1128).
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium)









there exists a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium where fund managers use symmetric switch-
ing strategies around t∗. A fund manager withdraws at date 1 whenever he observes si < t
∗
and rolls over otherwise. The bank fails whenever R < R∗ and survives otherwise. The tuple
























It follows that whenever Rs < R
∗, an otherwise solvent bank can fail due to illiquidity. The
ex ante risk of illiquidity is given by Pr[R̃ ∈ (Rs, R∗)], while the ex ante insolvency risk
is given by Pr[R̃ < Rs]. An illiquidity failure is brought about by a coordination failure:
too many fund managers withdraw their deposits at τ= 1, and although the bank would
be perfectly able to meet all liabilities at τ = 2, the illiquidity of its risky asset preclude
it from doing so at τ = 1 and it has to resort to the market to fire-sell assets to obtain
liquidity. Absent any additional interim financing, the costs associated with these fire-
sales are so large that the bank becomes unable to meet the remaining liabilities and goes
bankrupt.
7See Morris and Shin (2003) for an extended survey of Global Games.
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3 Comparative Statics
As already pointed out above, the difference between Rochet and Vives’s original model
and the version presented here is the explicit dependence of the solvency point on the
balance sheet composition, reflected in the the fact that Rs is a function of m. This entails
that the effect of a change in m on R∗ is composed of the liquidity effect and the solvency
effect. Firstly, consider the latter. It affects R∗ through the positive dependence of Rs on







Given its initial funding and given fixed liabilities D > D0 = 1, any reduction in I (increase
in M) implies that the bank must achieve a higher minimal return to remain solvent be-
cause cash holdings do not generate positive net returns which could be used to cover
liabilities. This explains the positive sign of ∂ Rs(m)/∂m in equation (8).
Secondly, consider the liquidity effect which works in the opposite direction. It becomes
relevant only if R∗ > Rs. For any given x , the larger m is, the smaller the exposure of
the bank to adverse market condition becomes, implying that the depletion of resources
through additional liquidity costs is less strong.
The following Lemma 1 provides the condition under which the liquidity effect outweighs
the solvency effect. Intuitively, the liquidity effect dominates when the net return from
holding a unit of the asset until τ = 1 becomes negative. In that case, fire-sales generate
less interim liquidity than cash holdings would have instead generated.
Lemma 1.
1. If R∗ = Rs, the failure point R∗ is strictly increasing in m.
2. If R∗ ∈ (Rs, (1+ λ)Rs), the failure point R∗ is strictly decreasing (increasing) in m if
and only if R∗ < (>)(1+λ).
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Policy Implications
The previous section begs the question how a prudential regulator can exploit the liquidity
effect in order to mitigate the illiquidity risk without stumbling across the solvency effect.
Of course, the solvency effect can be minimized through larger investments into the risky
asset or through larger equity holdings. The former would immediately raise the illiquid-
ity risk, and would thus be counterproductive. However, the latter seems to be promising
as it does not increase the liability burden and directly reduces the solvency threshold Rs.
In order to clarify the latter point, suppose that the failure point is increasing in m. Then,
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from Lemma 1 above, R∗ > (1+ λ). Further increases in m would only strengthen the
condition. What can be done to reverse the inequality? An increase in e would do. As the
failure point is strictly decreasing in e, it is possible to find a lower bound, denote it by e,
such that R∗ < (1+ λ) for all e > e. As e := (E0 + D0)/D, the respective value E0 which
sets e = e should then be implemented as the minimum capital requirement which would
revitalize the effectiveness of liquidity buffers.
Lemma 2.
1. The failure point R∗ is strictly decreasing in e.
2. R∗ < (1+λ) if and only if













Thus, the minimum capital requirement which guarantees the effectiveness of liquidity























As the minimum capital requirement is a function of λ, it depends on the degree of finan-
cial stress in the economy. However, the sign of dE0/dλ is not unambiguously clear in
general. But for the limit cases of β →∞ (the case of infinitely precise signals), or α→ 0
(a diffuse prior), E0 is strictly decreasing in λ. Hence, in these cases, the minimum capital
requirement can be decreased in times of severe financial stress.
It should be emphasized that the previous Lemma does not provide a normative state-
ment. It does not say anything about the desirability of using liquidity requirements as a
tool of prudential regulation. Rather, depending on the respective objective function of
the regulator, it is still possible that the respective amount of liquidity which minimizes
the risk of bank failure becomes too costly to implement in terms of foregone returns (cf.
Rochet and Vives (2004, p.)). However, the result allows to conclude that if prudential
regulators want to use liquidity requirements as a control tool, then they would be well-
advised not to implement them without paying attention to the bank’s capital-liability-
ratio. This provides a different rationale for minimum capital requirements. These do not
only serve the purpose of controlling the riskiness of banks’ asset portfolios, but also put
the regulator in a position to effectively use other tools at its disposal to keep the different
risks, which can lead to a banking failure, under control.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
1. The claim follows immediately from the derivative in equation (8).
2. Rewriting equation (6) gives
p

























The latter implies that the equilibrium threshold R∗ is given by the solution to


































which allows the application of the implicit function theorem.
















≶ 0⇔ 1+λ≶ R∗,
which proves the claim. .
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Proof of Lemma 2.












2. Evaluating equation (10) at R= (1+λ) and using the definition of Rs(m) gives


























As R∗ is strictly decreasing in e, any e ≥ e guarantees R∗ < (1+λ).
Finally, the minimum capital requirement can be calculated from the definitions of
e and e, and the inequality e ≥ e, by taking into account that initial equity cannot
become negative. This proves the claim. 
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